In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: prevent snt_unacked underflow on CONN_ACK
tipc_sk_conn_proto_rcv() subtracts the peer-supplied connection ack count from the unsigned 16-bit send counter snt_unacked without checking that it does not exceed the number of messages actually outstanding:
tsk->snt_unacked -= msg_conn_ack(hdr);
msg_conn_ack() is read straight from a received CONN_MANAGER/CONN_ACK message. If the ack count is larger than snt_unacked, the subtraction wraps to a near-maximum value, leaving tsk_conn_cong() permanently true and starving the connection of further transmits.
Validate the ACK count at the start of the CONN_ACK block and drop the message if it acknowledges more messages than are outstanding. A peer (or, for a local connection, the connected peer socket) can otherwise wedge a TIPC connections send side by sending an oversized connection ack.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e2c956745777e6ffdee7f30da5935741c03ee1e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3388145d258cf2c4c98278e3987296007d30672e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3cfa3d8e0dc167850edeb5bf5a07757db83fd54e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47ed873e4ceda34098bd46d8e96b4bb13cad3a04
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67e55b054bf8025658dc0e255057f2a6236416bd
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96f91b8ae1a489b3eca137e7acf42cf985fb8939
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab3e10b44ba5411779aac7afd2477917dd77750f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b44bebdd32c9ff66ee2aebfc317ced44bedd9335