CVE-2026-74635

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_cursor()

bit_cursor() fetches the glyph under the cursor with

c = scr_readw(vc_pos);
src = vc_font.data + ((c & charmask) * w * height);

where charmask is 0x1ff when vc_hi_font_mask is set. The screen buffer value comes directly from scr_readw() and may be larger than the current fonts glyph count.

Syzkaller triggers this via vcs_write(). The Call Trace shows vcs_write() in vc_screen.c writing an arbitrary 16-bit value with writev() to /dev/vcsa, which vcs_write_buf() in vc_screen.c stores via vcs_scr_writew() without checking charcount. The stored value is later read in bit_cursor() in bitblit.c.

When the font is changed from a font with 512 glyphs to a font with 256 glyphs, the screen buffer can retain characters with the high bit set from the previous mode, which could also produce the same out-of-bounds access.

BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in soft_cursor+0x378/0x6bc drivers/video/fbdev/core/softcursor.c:70 Read of size 16 at addr ffff800086c57970

Call Trace: soft_cursor+0x378/0x6bc drivers/video/fbdev/core/softcursor.c:70 bit_cursor+0xa90/0x1108 drivers/video/fbdev/core/bitblit.c:365 fbcon_cursor+0x344/0x498 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:1427 hide_cursor+0xdc/0x2d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:883 update_region+0x100/0x18c drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:669 vcs_write+0x8ec/0xaf0 drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:685

bit_putcs_aligned() and bit_putcs_unaligned() already clamp the glyph index to vc_font.charcount. Apply the same clamp in bit_cursor() after extracting the attribute and masking, before indexing fontdata.

The fix completes the bounds checking started in commit 18c4ef4e765a (fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_putcs*), which missed the cursor path.

This change should be safe because the clamp reuses the existing contract from fbcon: charcount is maintained under console_lock in con_font_set() and fbcon_font_set(), and hi_font_mask is cleared when switching from 512 to 256 glyphs. When stale screen data with high bits remains after a font switch, or when vcs_write() stores an arbitrary value, clamping the index to 0 prevents the out-of-bounds read without changing cursor semantics — the same fallback bit_putcs uses.

Affected Software

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/250159ace2dc53c1bdad267aa8da51b638748700
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46336f476484f36145e5117e72d7b590f47433ee
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94134d70abf9273b70499d97d0adc9185ef21091
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ea879862e66e354e616028c31b39aa3eb6d35d8
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc9db0d879c655d5dfd8add32fd60f13e65d132c
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf750cfeacf4e47ac72dadc7f05839696efb8576
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1e7351767dd30fc574395c82121e4c67b882da3
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e033cbf3975a8465f879ebd5989dc35b04423a4d