CVE Vulnerabilities

CVE-2026-75804

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Published: Sep 29, 2026 | Modified: Sep 29, 2026
CVSS 3.x
N/A
Source:
NVD
CVSS 2.x
RedHat/V2
RedHat/V3
7.5 IMPORTANT
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Ubuntu
LOW
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Issue summary: OpenSSL QUIC stack does not enforce connection level flow control for streams. Remote peers may send more bytes as long as they fit within the stream flow control limits.

Impact summary: A malicious remote peer may exploit the lack of connection flow control for streams to make the QUIC stack receive ~100MB of memory instead of 768 KiB (default flow control window size).

CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Description: The local QUIC stack advertises two flow control limits to its remote peer: stream flow control limit and connection flow control limit. The remote peer must follow both limits when transmitting stream data.

Whenever the local QUIC stack receives a stream frame, it validates that the size of the received stream frame stays within flow control limits. If either limit is exceeded (stream level or connection level), then the QUIC stack must close the connection with a flow control error.

The vulnerable OpenSSL QUIC stack enforces the stream-level but not the connection-level limit. To exploit the issue, three conditions must be met:

  • the remote peer opens several streams
  • each stream must stay within the stream-level flow control limit
  • there must be no zero-offset byte sent on any of the streams (to prevent the vulnerable QUIC stack from consuming data). By meeting the conditions above, the remote peer may make the local stack allocate 2 x MAX_STREAMS x (stream flow control limit) bytes of memory. MAX_STREAMS defaults to 100, and the limit applies to both bidirectional and unidirectional streams, making it 200 in total. The default flow control window for a stream is 512kB. The remote peer may force the vulnerable QUIC stack to allocate 100MB of heap per connection.

FIPS impact: no The FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.

Weakness

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.

Affected Software

NameVendorStart VersionEnd Version
Red Hat Hardened ImagesRedHatopenssl-main-3.5.9-0.1.hum1*
Red Hat Hardened ImagesRedHatopenssl3-main-3.5.9-0.1.hum1*
Edk2Ubuntudevel*
Edk2Ubunturesolute*
Edk2-hweUbuntudevel*
Edk2-hweUbunturesolute*
NodejsUbuntuesm-apps/jammy*
NodejsUbuntujammy*
OpensslUbuntudevel*
OpensslUbunturesolute*
OpensslUbuntuupstream*

Potential Mitigations

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”

  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

  • Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:

  • The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.

  • The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.

  • If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.

  • Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

  • Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.

  • When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.

  • Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).

References