HTTPX2 is a next generation HTTP client for Python. Prior to 2.11.0, Request._prepare() in src/httpx2/httpx2/_models.py can add a body-derived Content-Length header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied Transfer-Encoding header because its setdefault() processing checks each default header independently rather than treating the two framing headers as mutually exclusive. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can therefore be serialized over HTTP/1.1 with both headers, allowing request smuggling or connection desynchronization when downstream intermediaries disagree about which framing header takes precedence. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.
Weakness
The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.
Affected Software
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.5 | RedHat | rhaii/vllm-rocm-rhel9:1791425869 | * |
| Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.5 | RedHat | rhaii/vllm-gaudi-rhel9:1791427182 | * |
| Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.5 | RedHat | rhaii/vllm-cuda-rhel9:1791473631 | * |
| Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.5 | RedHat | rhaii/vllm-spyre-rhel9:1791818357 | * |
| Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.5 | RedHat | rhaii/vllm-cpu-rhel9:1791473614 | * |
| Python-httpx2 | Ubuntu | upstream | * |
Extended Description
HTTP requests or responses (“messages”) can be malformed or unexpected in ways that cause web servers or clients to interpret the messages in different ways than intermediary HTTP agents such as load balancers, reverse proxies, web caching proxies, application firewalls, etc. For example, an adversary may be able to add duplicate or different header fields that a client or server might interpret as one set of messages, whereas the intermediary might interpret the same sequence of bytes as a different set of messages. For example, discrepancies can arise in how to handle duplicate headers like two Transfer-encoding (TE) or two Content-length (CL), or the malicious HTTP message will have different headers for TE and CL. The inconsistent parsing and interpretation of messages can allow the adversary to “smuggle” a message to the client/server without the intermediary being aware of it. This weakness is usually the result of the usage of outdated or incompatible HTTP protocol versions in the HTTP agents.