Impact: The undici WebSocket client enforces maxPayloadSize per-frame but does not enforce the cumulative size of fragmented uncompressed messages. A malicious WebSocket server can stream many small fragments that each pass per-frame validation but collectively exceed the configured limit, causing unbounded memory growth in the client process. The result is memory exhaustion and a denial of service.
Affected applications are those using the undici WebSocket client (new WebSocket(…)) that can be induced to connect to an attacker-controlled or compromised WebSocket endpoint.
This is a regression specific to undici 8.1.0. The 6.25.0 line shipped the equivalent cumulative check from the start and is unaffected. The 7.x line never had the maxPayloadSize feature and is also unaffected.
Patches: Upgrade to undici >= 8.5.0.
Workarounds: No workaround is available. The fix must be applied through an upgrade.
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Undici | Nodejs | 8.0.0 (including) | 8.5.0 (excluding) |
| Red Hat Hardened Images | RedHat | nodejs26-main-26.3.0-1.2.hum1 | * |
| Red Hat Hardened Images | RedHat | rust-main-1.96.0-1.hum1 | * |
| Red Hat Hardened Images | RedHat | nodejs24-main-24.16.0-1.hum1 | * |
| Red Hat Hardened Images | RedHat | nodejs25-main-25.9.0-1.1.hum1 | * |
| Node-undici | Ubuntu | questing | * |
Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.